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EPA's New Regulatory Policy: Two Steps Back
Yekaterina Korostashl
As many as 600 operating power plants in the United States
are between thirty and fifty years old and are up to ten times dirtier
than new power plants built today.2 Many of the technologies that
remove pollution and increase operating efficiencies have been
available for decades, but power plants have been slow to adapt.3
The New Source Review ("NSR") provisions of the Clean Air Act
("CAA") lie at the heart of the continued existence of these
grandfathered plants.4 While the main goal of Congress in
promulgating the CAA was to improve air quality, it also sought to
avoid imposing the heavy burden polluters would face if they were
forced to immediately install new equipment. Consequently, the
NSR program requires owners and operators of plants to install
emission controls only when the source undergoes a
"modification," a physical change accompanied by an emissions
increase.5 As all plants eventually updated their facilities or shut
down, Congress felt confident that this regime would assure
"attainment of pollution control by a fixed date."6
In August 2003, the administration adopted changes to
these regulations that will affect more than 17,000 coal-fired power
' J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2005. Special
thanks to Donald T. Hornstein, Reef Ivey II Research Professor of Law at the
University of North Carolina School of Law, for his review and input.
2 Sierra Club, Coal-Fired Power Plants Create Harmful Emissions, in
POLLUTION: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 31 (James Haley ed., Greenhaven
Press, 2003).
3 Adam Rose, Clean Coal Technologies and Future Prospects for Coal, ANN.
REV. ENERGY ENV'T, 1991, at 60.
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7503(a)(2) (2000).
5 Id. § 7411 (a)(4).
6 H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 211 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077,
1290.
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plants in the United States.7 The new rule will exempt
grandfathered power plants from this core requirement of the
CAA. Under the new rule, if the cost of a modification to a plant
is below twenty percent of the unit's value, the plant will be
exempt from installing the requisite pollution control technology.
According to administration officials, the new rule will allow
plants to modernize more easily and lead to greater efficiency
without increasing pollution.8 Mr. Jeffrey Holmstead, the
administrator of the Office of Air and Radiation in the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), testified to the Senate
that the changes are environmentally neutral and would not
adversely affect public health. 9 Many environmentalists and state
officials, however, are outraged at what they perceive to be a
gutting of the CAA.10 Twelve states, led by New York Attorney
Gen. Eliot Spitzer, are challenging the new regulations in court.
1
On December 25, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia granted an emergency motion for stay that barred the
new rules from taking effect pending the outcome of litigation. 12
This comment argues that the new rule undermines the
regulatory scheme envisioned by Congress in promulgating the
CAA and should be invalidated by the D.C. Circuit under the
Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.13 The EPA will likely lose under
the Chevron "Step One" analysis because congressional intent is
clear from the plain language of the CAA; Congress defined
7 Katharine Seelye, Administration Adopts Rule on Antipollution Exemption,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at A18.8 id.
9 Staying Healthy: Health Issues Surrounding Proposed Changes in Clean Air
Standards: Hearing Before Senate Subcommittee on Public Health of the
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong.,
Washington (2003) [hereinafter Staying Healthy].
10 David Kocieniewski, States to Fight Easing of Rules on Pollution by Power
Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003, at B1.
11 The states involved are Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. Court Cuffs Bush on Clean Air, TAMPA TRIBUTE,
Dec. 30, 2003, at 6.
12 New York v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 03-1380 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 25, 2003).
13 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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"modification" to mean "any physical change." Even under
Chevron "Step Two" analysis, the new rule is unreasonable
because it conflicts with both the broader goals of the CAA and the
specific objectives of the NSR provisions. Finally, if Chevron
does not clearly lead the D.C. Circuit to invalidate the new rules,
the case of MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T14 clearly
points to the conclusion that the EPA exceeded its authority in
promulgating this radical redirection of the statutory NSR
program.
Part I of this paper outlines some of the dangers of
unregulated power plant emissions, focusing in particular on health
and environmental effects. Part II is a brief summary of the NSR
program prior to amendment. Part III summarizes the changes to
the NSR and analyzes their purported benefits. Finally, Part IV
argues that the court in New York v. EPA15 should find that the
EPA exceeded its statutory authority in abandoning its
longstanding interpretation of the CAA.
I. The Threat Met by the Clean Air Act
Today, fifty-four percent of the electricity in the United
States is provided by coal-fired power stations.16 These plants are
the primary stationary sources of emissions, contributing to
respiratory disease and such major environmental problems as
smog, acid rain, and global warming. 17 They are responsible for
ninety-six percent of sulfur dioxide emissions, ninety-three percent
of nitrogen oxide emissions, eighty-eight percent of carbon dioxide
emissions, and ninety-nine percent of mercury emissions.18
It is important to note that emissions of particulate matter,
sulfur dioxide, and carbon monoxide have actually decreased in the
last twenty years.' 9 At the same time, emissions of nitrogen oxides
14 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
'5 New York v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 03-1380 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 25, 2003).16 1d
17 Sierra Club, supra note 2, at 32.
81id
19 Id. at 53. This data covers 1981-2000.
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have increased. 20 Recent scientific evidence, however, revealed
that particulates and nitrogen oxides are more dangerous to public
health than previously thought.2' On July 19, 1997, the EPA
issued updated air quality standards for particulate matter and
ground ozone. 22 The new standards reflect the mounting evidence
that the regulations set in the 1970s were not protective enough
and that many Americans faced health risks because of the
inadequacy of these out-dated controls.
23
Although federal air pollution law began with the Clean Air
Act of 1963,24 the major features of the modem CAA originated in
the 1970 Amendments. Congress passed these amendments
primarily in response to deteriorating air quality in the country's
major urban areas.26 The stated purpose of the 1963 Act is "to
protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as
to promote the public health and welfare and the productive
capacity of its population."27 In 1977, Congress, frustrated with
the failure of the CAA to meet its clean air goals, enacted new
amendments. The most important contribution of the 1977
Amendments was the establishment of the NSR programs which
subjected new or modified stationary sources to more stringent
preconstruction permitting requirements than those imposed by the
earlier New Source Performance Standards.28 The CAA controls
20 Id.
21 Carol Browner, Clean Air Regulations Protect Public Health, in
POLLUTION: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 137 (James Haley ed., Greenhaven
Press,
2003).
22 Envtl. Prot. Agency, Air Quality Has Improved, in POLLUTION: CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES 53 (James Haley ed., Greenhaven Press, 2003).
23 Id.
24 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
POLICY 495 (4th ed. 2003).
25 Id.
26 John Boyd, The NEW New Source Review: Teaching Old Sources New
Tricks?, 11 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 401 (2003).
27 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000).
28 A stationary source is defined as "any building, structure, facility, or
installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant." 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (a)(3)
(2000). With regard to permitting requirements, the program differentiates
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six "criteria" pollutants: sulfur dioxide, 29 nitrogen dioxide,"
particulate matter,31 carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants and
between attainment and non-attainment areas of the country, a distinction which
is explained in greater detail later in the comment.
29 The burning of fossil fuels by power stations produces the majority of sulphur
oxide emissions. INDERJEET SETHI ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION:
CAUSES, EFFECTS, AND CONTROL 70 (1991). Sulphur dioxide is a colorless gas
with a pungent odor which, at low concentrations, produces respiratory
irritation. Id. Further, sulphur dioxide reacts with oxygen in the atmosphere to
form sulphur trioxide which in turn reacts quickly with water to form sulphuric
acid. Id. Sulphuric acid is a component of acid rain and aerosols (fogs) of
sulphuric acid contribute to the haze typically seen in the industrial areas. Sierra
Club, supra note 2, at 33.30 Nitrogen oxides play multiple roles in air pollution. SETHI ET AL., supra note
29, at 80. They are among the most toxic substances found in the atmosphere.
Id. at 81. Nitrogen dioxide is the most dangerous nitrogen oxide to public health
because of its abundance and toxicity. Id.
Combustion of nitrogen produces nitric oxide, a colorless gas. It is
produced when the temperature is high enough to cause a reaction between
nitrogen and oxygen in the air. Nitrogen oxide that is emitted from smokestacks
into the atmosphere is almost all in the form of nitric oxide. A significant
portion of this gas reacts in the atmosphere to form the more toxic nitrogen
dioxide. Id.
Nitrogen dioxide is a deadly poison and is the only widely prevalent
pollutant gas that is colored. Id. at 82, 83. Pure nitrogen dioxide is deep reddish
brown and is responsible for discoloration of the air on bad smog days. Id. at
83. Both oxides of nitrogen are potential health hazards. Id. at 127.
Furthermore, nitrogen oxides play a major role in formation of ozone,
particulate matter, and acid rain. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Air Quality Has
Improved, in POLLUTION: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 54 (James Haley ed.,
Greenhaven Press, 2003).
The reaction between nitrogen oxide and volatile organic compounds in
the presence of sunlight produces ground level ozone, commonly known as
smog. Sierra Club, supra note 2, at 32. When inhaled, smog causes a burning of
the cell wall of the lungs and air passages. Id. Ozone can cause transient
symptoms such as coughing and pain when breathing deeply, a reduction in lung
function, and inflammation of the lung. Staying Healthy, supra note 9, at 14.
Repeated exposure to smog may lead to permanent damage to lung tissue. Id.
31 Particulate matter that enters and remains in the lungs can exert a toxic effect
in three different ways. Staying Healthy, supra note 9, at 174. First, particles
may interfere with clearance mechanisms in the reparatory tracts therefore
preventing removal of other harmful particles. Second, particles may carry
absorbed or adsorbed gas molecules and thus enable them to reach and remain in
the sensitive areas of the lungs. Lastly, the particles may themselves be
300 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 5
hydrocarbons.32 In controlling these pollutants, the CAA provides
for two types of regulations-state implementation plans and new
source review.
II. The Regulatory Scheme
A. State Implementation Plans
The CAA requires the EPA to establish National Ambient
Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") for all criteria pollutants.33
"Primary" NAAQS are set for each criteria pollutant to protect
public health with an adequate margin of safety. 34 These air
quality standards must reflect the latest scientific knowledge
relating to the effects of criteria pollutants on public health and
must be revised every five years. 35 "Secondary" NAAQS protect
the public welfare "from any known or anticipated adverse effects
associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient
air.''36 These adverse effects include a pollutant's impact on soils,
water, vegetation, wildlife, and climate.
37
The states have the primary responsibility to ensure that
their air quality meets the NAAQS.38 Section 110 of the CAA
requires each state to develop and submit for approval a state
implementation plan ("SIP"). 39 These plans must provide for
"implementation, maintenance, and enforcement" of standards by
the state.40 Each state government decides how the sources within
intrinsically toxic. Id. Fine particles are associated with coughing, wheezing
and chronic bronchitis as well as tens of thousands of premature deaths in
persons with heart and lung disease. Id.
32 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1977).
13 40 C.F.R. § 50.2(b) (2003). In 2001, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the ability
of Congress to delegate power to the EPA for the purposes of setting air quality
standards. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
34 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000).
31 Id. § 7408(a)(2).
36 Id. § 7409(b)(2).
37 Id. § 7602(h).
38 Id. § 7407.
39 Id. § 7411 (c)(1).
401d. § 7410(a)(1).
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its jurisdiction ought to be controlled in order to meet NAAQS. 4 1
If the SIP fails to comply with statutory and regulatory
requirements, the EPA's Administrator may reject the SIP and
impose penalties on the state.42 Furthermore, the Administrator
may take the power of regulation away from the state by
promulgating a federal implementation plan within two years of a
state's failure to comply.
4
B. New Source Review
1. New Source Performance Standards
Under the 1970 and 1977 Amendments, the construction or
modification of a stationary source emitting criteria pollutants must
meet New Source Performance Standards set by the EPA.44 These
standards are applicable to stationary sources which are built or
modified after the publication of the regulations.45 Plants built
before 1971 are exempt from these requirements unless they are
modified or reconstructed.46
2. New Source Review-Attainment and
Nonattainment Areas
The New Source Review program requires an owner or
operator who either (1) builds a major stationary source of criteria
41 States are required to design SIPs that will satisfy NAAQS, but they can
impose more stringent standards if they so choose. 42 U.S.C. § 7416; see also
Union Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 264-65 (1976).
42 Mich. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Browner, 230 F.3d 181, 185 (6th Cir. 2000).
43 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1).
44 Id. § 7411 (a)(1)-(2).
45 Id. § 7411 (a)(2).
46 Susanne Pegano, Texas: PUC Rule Allows Utilities to Recover Cost of
Emission Control at Grandfathered Plants, 31 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1840, 1840
(2000). Although NSR does not apply to these sources, states can still subject
plants built before 1971 to regulations as part of SIP. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr.,
2002 Energy Law Symposium: State and Federal Command-and-Control
Regulation of Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Electric Power Generating Plants, 32
ENVTL. L. 369, 381 (2002).
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pollutants or (2) makes major modifications to such a source to
apply for a preconstruction air emissions permit and submit to a
preconstruction review. NSR draws a major distinction between
those areas of the country that meet or exceed the NAAQS
(attainment areas) and those areas that do not meet the NAAQS
(nonattainment areas).47 In order to address this distinction, NSR
envisions separate programs for non-attainment and attainment
areas, each with its own set of requirements for new or modified
major sources.48 These requirements deal mostly with requisite
air-pollution control technology.49
In attainment areas, the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration ("PSD") aims to prevent especially clean areas from
becoming any more polluted. In these regions, the best available
control technology ("BACT") is required for major sources.
50
BACT determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis, and
additional requirements apply if a source is located in a particularly
pristine area, such as a park or a wildlife reserve. 51 Furthermore,
no individual source is allowed to degrade more than a certain
52percentage of existing clean air.
In nonattainment areas, more stringent standards apply. In
these "dirty air" areas, NSR requires a source to employ
technology that guarantees lowest achievable emission rate
("LAER"). LAER is defined as the most stringent SIP emission
limitation or "the most stringent emission limitation which is
achieved in practice" by such a source, whichever is more
stringent.53 Furthermore, the owners or operators of affected
sources must guarantee that any new emissions from new or
modified sources will be offset by equivalent or greater reductions
in emissions from some other source.54
47 Each county in the country is classified as either attainment or nonattainment.
48 Reitze, supra note 46, at 385.
49 Boyd, supra note 26, at 405.
50 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).
51 Id. § 7475(a)(3).
52 Id. § 7479(3).
51 Id. § 7475(a)(4).
54 Id. § 7501(3).
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3. Routine Maintenance, Repair and
Replacement ("RMRR") Exception
NSR programs apply to new major sources or any existing
major source that will increase emissions by undertaking
modification of particular magnitudes.55 In attainment areas, "a
major source" is one with the potential to emit one hundred tons
per year of any air pollutant from stationary sources in twenty-
eight listed categories. 56 In nonattainment areas, the threshold for
a major source ranges from ten to one hundred tons per year
depending on the severity of the area's noncompliance.
57
NSR provisions use the definition of "modification"
provided by section 111 of the CAA, which defined the term for
the purposes of the NSPS program. 58 The term "modification" is
defined as, "any physical change in, or change in the method of
operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any
air pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the
emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted.,
59
Consequently, to determine whether an activity in question
constitutes a "modification," one must make a twofold inquiry: (1)
is the proposed project a physical change or change in method of
operation and (2) will the activity lead to an increase in emissions.
These questions have been the subject of intense litigation and in
two significant court decisions decided in August 2003, the courts
have split on both issues.
60
Because Congress defined "modification" to include any
physical change, the EPA and the courts have construed this
provision broadly. 61 Nevertheless, not all physical changes that
increase emissions are "modifications" that trigger installation of
55 Boyd, supra note 26, at 406.
56 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1).
57 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,187 (2003).
58 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(a)(4).
59 id.
60 See the discussion of the Ohio Edison and Duke Power cases in the
Enforcement section of this comment.
61 United States v. Ohio Edison, 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 854 (S.D. Ohio 2003); see
also Wisc. Elec. Power Corp. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F. Supp. 2d 994 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
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pollution control technology. Recognizing that the interpretation
of modification to include literally "any physical change," might
lead to absurd results, the EPA created a de minimis exception not
contained in the CAA.62 If the activity in question qualifies as
routine maintenance repair and replacement ("RWRR"), it is
exempt from the NSR requirements.
63
Precisely which activities constitute routine maintenance
repair and replacement is at the heart of NSR litigation. The
multiple challenges brought by power plants are due, at least in
part, to the fact that EPA provided little guidance for owners and
operators of affected facilities. In fact, the exact criteria were
64never clarified prior to litigation. However, to aid owners and
operators of power plants, the agency established a searchable
database of its past applicability determinations. It also
encouraged owners and operators who are unsure if a certain
activity falls within the RMRR exception to consult the appropriate
reviewing authority for assistance.65
Nonetheless, the scope of the RMRR exception has been
primarily determined through litigation. The court in Wisconsin
Electric Power Co. v. Reilly (" WEPCO") held that the
determination of whether an activity is routine must be made by
the EPA on a case-by-case basis, to be set aside only if it is
62 "[T]he definition of physical or operational change in section 111 (a)(4) could
standing alone, encompass the most mundane activities at an industrial facility
(even the repair or replacement of a single leaky pipe, or a change in the way
that pipe is utilized)." Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of
Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans;
Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314,
32,326 (July 21, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60).
63 40 C.F.R. § 52.2 lb(2)(iii)(a) (2003).64 Note that an agency's ability to retrospectively interpret rules is generally
accepted. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Court, Administrative
Agencies, andArticle III, 101 HARV. L. REv. 915, 982-84 (1988) (discussing
the deference accorded to agency decisions by reviewing Article III courts);
Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 2-7 (1983) (discussing, in a pre-Chevron context, binding deference an to
agency's interpretations).
65 See Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 889 F.2d 292, 294
(lst Cir. 1989).
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66arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In determining
whether the activity in question constitutes routine maintenance
repair and replacement, the agency must weigh the project's: (1)
nature, (2) extent, (3) purpose, (4) frequency, (5) cost, and (6)
other relevant factors. 7 In WEPCO, the modification at issue was
a set of renovations in the power company's Port Washington
electric power plant located on Lake Michigan. 68 The plant
proposed a "life extension project," which consisted of a number
of repairs, including a replacement in whole of plate-type air
heaters. 69 WEPCO argued that the project qualified as routine
maintenance and consequently should be exempt from NSR
requirements. 70 The court rejected these arguments, noting that, by
opening "vistas of indefinite immunity from the provisions of
NSPS and PSD,' such an interpretation of NSR would be
contrary to congressional intent of "'attainment of pollution control
standards by a fixed date.'
72
The second requirement that must be satisfied for the
application of the NSR is that the activity in question must be
accompanied by a significant increase in emissions. 73 Whether a
modification leads to an increase in emissions turns on the EPA's
method of calculating emissions.74 In 1992, the EPA promulgated
a rule for utility sources which established that the PSD emissions
test will compare past actual to future actual emissions.75 On
December 31, 2002, the EPA released a rule that, among other
things, relaxed the method of calculation of baseline emissions.
76
66 Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1990).
67 Id. at 905.
68 id.
69 Id. at 911-12.
70 Id. at 911.
71 Id. at 909.
72 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-294, supra note 6, at 2).
73 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(i) (2003).
74 Kevin A. Gaynor & Benjamin S. Lippard, Environmental Enforcement
Developments in 2003, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,073, 10,076 (2004).
75 Id.
76 The rule contained five components: (1) baseline calculation, (2) actual-to-
actual methodology, (3) actual plant wide applicability limits (PAL's), (4) clean
units, and (5) pollution control projects (PCP's). Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR): Baseline
306 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 5
The effect of the 2002 amendment was to permit a source to
choose the highest actual emissions rate over a ten year period and
use that as a baseline.7 Although the 2002 amendment was
challenged by the states and distorted the real-life picture of the
plants' past activities, it has been largely eclipsed by the EPA's
more recent changes in regulatory policy.
4. EPA's Enforcement Initiative
While the owners and operators of power plants have
generally agreed on the relevance of factors enunciated by the
WEPCO court to the "routine" determination, they have argued
that the inquiry should focus on industry practice. 78 In contrast,
the EPA has contested that it must look at what is routine for a
particular plant in question. The industry has also disputed the
EPA's method of calculating emissions for the purposes of the
second prong of the routine maintenance repair and replacement
test.
In 1999, the EPA initiated active enforcement of the NSR
program by suing seven coal-fired power plants in various federal
courts. 79 The EPA's efforts resulted in a number of important
decisions and several settlements. 80 Unfortunately, the litigation
and the resulting decisions have not provided the much-needed
clarity to this area of law. United States v. Ohio Edison Co.,
decided on August 7, 2003, represents a veritable victory for the
agency. 81 The court upheld the EPA's determination of "routine"
maintenance and its method of calculating emissions increases.
82
However, only days later in United States v. Duke Energy Corp.,
Emissions Determination, Actual-to-Future-Actual Methodology, Plantwide
Applicability Limitations, Clean Units, Pollution Control Projects, 67 Fed. Reg.
80186 (Dec. 31, 2002) [hereinafter Baseline Emissions Determination] (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52).
77 Id.
78 Gaynor & Lippard, supra note 75, at 10,076.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
82 1d. at 889.
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Middle District of North
Carolina sided with the utility company on both issues.
83
In Ohio Edison, the court held the company liable for all
eleven activities alleged by the EPA to be violations of the CAA.84
Based on the plain language of the CAA and on the agency's
regulations, the court determined that the routine maintenance
exemption is narrow in scope.85 Finding that Ohio Edison's
modifications were not routine, the court cited a number of factors
that weighed against the company: (1) the projects required
several months of downtime, (2) the projects extended the lives of
generative units, (3) the projects were preformed only once or
twice during the life of a particular unit, and (4) the projects
involved capital expenditures. 86 In light of these factors, the court
in Ohio Edison held that "types of activities undertaken within the
industry as a whole have little bearing on the ['routine' analysis] if
an activity is performed at a unit only once or twice in the lifetime
of that particular unit.",
87
Ohio Edison also affirmed the Agency's method of
calculating emissions.88 The EPA argued that the new rule should
account for increased hours of operation that would result from
reduced breakdown time after the modifications. 89 Ohio Edison
disputed this interpretation of the NSR provisions on the basis that
the regulations expressly excluded "increased hours of operation"
from triggering NSR.90 However, the Ohio Edison court, relying
on the fact that NSR regulations specify a "tons per year"
measurement of emissions and the increased hours of operation in
this case were accompanied by a physical change, upheld the
inclusion of "increased hours of operations" in the post-
modification emissions calculations.
91
83 United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
84 Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
85 Id. at 887.
86 Id. at 855.
17 Id. at 856.
88 Id. at 878-80.
89 
id.
90 Id. at 876.
91Id. at 875-76.
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However, on August 26, 2003, in the Duke Energy case, the
district court for Middle District of North Carolina held that
"[w]hat has occurred within the industry... is relevant and must
inform the routine inquiry." 92 In that case, the EPA filed a suit
against Duke Energy, alleging that the company made
modifications to eight coal-fired power plants in North and South
Carolina in violation of the NSR provisions of the CAA.9 3 The
twenty-nine projects at issue consisted of replacement and/or
redesign of boiler tube assemblies that would extend the plants'
lives for an additional twenty years.94 The district court squarely
rejected the EPA's argument that the relevant inquiry is whether a
replacement in question is routine for the particular unit.
95
Ultimately, however, the court did not decide the "routine" issue,
holding only that there were genuine questions of fact as to what is
routine for the utility industry.
96
The court in Duke Energy also rejected the EPA's
arguments concerning methods of emissions calculations. It held
that there is an emissions increase caused by a project only if the
project increases the short-term/hourly emissions rate from the
facility. 97 The court justified its decision on the "hours of
operations" exclusion; the exclusion that was explicitly rejected by
the Ohio Edison court.98 Finally, the court held that the "actual to
actual" emissions test, adopted by the court in Ohio Edison, is not
the law because of the difference in baseline possibilities.99 In
effect, after Duke Energy, only projects that caused an increase in
fuel input capacity on an hourly basis will trigger NSR. 00
Before the agency could assimilate the conflicting
messages of Duke Energy and Ohio Edison, the EPA issued a
92 United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 636 (M.D.N.C.
2003).
9' Id. at 623.
94 Id. at 623-25.
95 Id. at 626-36.
96 Id. at 639.
9 7 Id. at 649.
98 Id. at 641.
9 9 Id. at 647-49.
100 Gaynor & Lippard, supra note 75, at 10,079.
SPRING 20041 EPA's NEW REGULATORY POLICY 309
major revision to what the agency itself considered to be "routine
maintenance and repairs."
III. Changes to the New Source Review Rules
A. The Changes
On August 27, 2003, the EPA issued a final rule that
revised the routine maintenance repair and replacement
exclusion.101 In this rulemaking, the EPA discarded the agency's
traditional case-by-case approach in favor of a bright line rule.'
0 2
Industry has long argued that the case-by-case approach provided a
disincentive for maintaining and improving safety, reliability, and
efficiency of the power stations.10 3 Responding to this critique,
EPA's new
rule specifies that the replacement of components of
a process unit with identical components or their
functional equivalents will come within the scope of
the [RMRR] exclusion, provided (1) the cost of
replacing the component falls below 20 percent of
the replacement value of the process unit of which
the component is a part, (2) the replacement does
not change the unit's basic design parameters, and
(3) the unit continues to meet enforceable emission
and operational limitation.
104
Consequently, the new rule creates two categories of activities that
would automatically fall within the routine maintenance exception
and thus be exempt from the agency's case-by-case evaluation.'0 5
101 Environmental Protection Agency, New Source Review,
http://www.epa.gov/nsr (last visited Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter New Source
Review] (on file with North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
102 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Non-Attainment New
Source Review (NSR): Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine
Maintenance, Repair and Replacement Exclusion, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,248, 61,250-
51 (Oct. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Equipment Replacement Provision] (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52).
103 Id. at 61,251.
l4Id. at 61,252.
105 id.
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The first category consists of modifications that fall within the
twenty percent annual allowance and the second encompasses
activities that are considered pure "equipment replacement" that
make no functional changes in source operation. Furthermore,
modifications that fall outside either per se category could still be
exempt from NSR though the agency's traditional case-by-case
approach. 107
In the preamble of the new rule, the EPA identifies three
problems with the old approach. First, the old standard creates
uncertainty for owners and operators of stationary sources.'
8
Second, it is imprecise, complicated, and imposes burdens on state
and local reviewing authorities that are responsible for making the
complex determinations. 0 9 Finally, the main problem with the old
rule was that the risks and potential costs associated with NSR or
PSD review may have deterred owners or operators of plants from
undertaking activities that were legitimately routine
maintenance.110 The EPA anticipated, therefore, that the effect of
the new rule would be "to remove disincentives to undertaking
RMRR activities falling within the rule, thereby enhancing key
operational elements such as efficiency, safety, reliability, and
environmental performance.""11
B. The Benefits Intended by the Rule
As stated in the preamble of the new rule, the primary
criticisms of the old RMRR regulations pertain to its form rather
than its scope. In law and economics terminology, the
10 6 id.
10' Id. at 61,250.
108 id.
109 Id.
110 These uncertainties can discourage replacements that would
promote safety, reliability and efficiency even in instances
where, if the matter were brought to EPA, we would
determine that the replacement in question was RMRR. Such
discouragement results in lost capacity and lost opportunities
to improve energy efficiency and reduce air pollution.
Id.
... Id. at 61,251.
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administration seeks to replace a standard, the old case-by-case
approach, with a rule, a bright line test akin in form to a speed
limit. The new rule allows industrial plants to avoid installing
pollution control devices when they upgrade equipment as long as
the cost of the upgrade is less than twenty percent of the cost of the
power plant.
One of the benefits of this rule is that it provides more
certainty as to what constitutes a "modification" under NSR. As
discussed above, the EPA previously used a standard in
determining what constituted routine maintenance. Although the
EPA tried to clarify the regulations by setting up a database of
previous rulings, 12 the uncertainty functioned as a disincentive to
installing technology that constituted legitimate RMRR and would
render the power plant more efficient.'
The distinction between rules and standards turns on
whether the law is given content ex ante or expost.114 Rules
involve ex ante prescriptions while the exact content of a standard
does not become clear until after litigation.1 5 Because
promulgation of rules requires investigation and empirical analysis,
they are typically more costly to create."6 Standards, on the other
hand, are more costly after they become law.117 The costs are
threefold. First, standards are more difficult for law enforcement
and the judiciary to apply because they require determination of
the law's content.' 18 These costs, however, are reduced after
precedent is set, at which point a standard functions more like a
112 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Non-attainment New
Source Review (NSR): Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement, 67 Fed.
Reg. 80,290, 80,292 (Dec. 31, 2002). Applicability determinations are available
electronically from the Region 7 NSR Policy and Guidance Database,
http://www.epa.gov/Region7/programs/artd/air/nsr/nsrpg.htm (last visited Apr.
7, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
113 New Source Review, supra note 101.
114 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 559 (1992).
115
id.
116 Id. at 559.
117 Id. at 563.
1181id
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rule. 1 9 Second, the cost of legal advice with respect to standards
is higher because counsel must predict how courts will apply a
standard to a particular situation. 12 Consequently, it is more
costly for individuals to interpret a standard. 12 1 Third, vagueness
of a standard deters legitimate conduct by creating a risk that such
conduct will be found to violate the prohibition. 122 This effect is
especially problematic when the legitimate activity in question
would be more valuable socially than it would privately.'
23
Demonstrating this effect, a risk-averse power plant management
may forgo updating the facilities even when the expected value of
the update may be greater than the expected costs. 1
24
Although some commentators expressed doubt on whether
it would be feasible to avoid case-by-case determinations in an
industry where sources are relatively few and so differently
situated, using a rule, as opposed to a standard, would be a
legitimate policy decision. 125 The new regulations, however,
forego some of the above-mentioned benefits of a rule because the
old case-by-case approach remains available. 126 There is plenty of
opportunity for litigation to continue. For projects that exceed the
twenty percent allowance, the industry receives a "second bite at
the apple" so to speak, and the courts will still have to engage in
the case-by-case analysis criticized in the preamble of the new
rule. Consequently, the new regulations will not necessarily be
less costly and easier to apply in court.
The main benefit of the new rule is that it will not deter
management from engaging in legitimate RMRR activities. If
management is risk-averse, then the uncertainty generated by a
standard deters investment while known costs imposed by a rule
119 Id.
120 Id. at 565.
121 Id. at 559.
122 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 556 (6th ed. 2003).
123 Id. at 557.
124 Id. at 559.
125 Victor B. Flatt et al., Let the People Speak: Notice-and-Comment
Rulemaking (Lessons From the Controversial New Source Review Proposal of
the Clean AirAct), 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,115, 10,115 (2004).
126 Equipment Replacement Provision, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,247, 61,252 (Oct. 27,
2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52).
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might not, even when the expected costs of the regulation imposed
by the rule or standard are equal. This is especially important if
positive externalities from power plant investment, such as an
increase in reliability of the power supply, are substantial.
The new rule is also easier to understand in the sense that
power plants clearly have the green light to update technology
regardless of pollution increases, as long as the cost of the project
does not exceed twenty percent. However, these benefits of clarity
come at the expense of Congressional objectives in promulgating
the Clean Air Act. The problem is that the new regulations go
beyond changing the routine maintenance rule'sform from a
standard to a rule. The new rule drastically affects the scope of the
routine maintenance exception.
127
IV. EPA's Legal Justifications for the New Rule
The central issue to be considered by the D.C. Circuit will
be whether the EPA's proposed new rule is justified under the
CAA. As is evident from the discussion of the EPA's enforcement
initiative, the Agency's new rule is a significant departure from its
earlier regulations and from judicial interpretations of the CAA.
Although the EPA did not clearly state the justification for the new
rule, analysis of the proposed rule reveals that the EPA relied
primarily on Chevron deference.
128
127 Mathew C. Stephenson, A Tale of Two Theories: The Legal Basis for EPA 's
Proposed Revision to the Routine Maintenance, Repair, and Replacement
Exception, and the Implications for Administrative Law, 33 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,789, 10,794 (2003).
128 Id. The new regulations might also be justified on a "de minimis" theory.
Equipment Replacement Provision, 68 Fed. Reg. at 61,270. Even though
section 111 of the Clean Air Act covers "any" physical or operational change,
EPA may permissibly refuse to enforce the statute's literal provisions against
activities that are so trivial, and where regulation would be of such minimal
value that they ought to be considered beyond the scope of the Act. Id. If the
EPA chose to defend the rule on these grounds, the agency would have to show
that the current rule is precisely such a trivial change. Yet this theory, as applied
to the changes in the New Source Review, yields problematic outcomes. In
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, the D.C. Circuit held that the EPA can exempt de
minimis activity. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979). However, the EPA could only
exempt the most minor activities so that the program would be workable
"[A] regulation promulgated by an administrative agency is
invalid to the extent the regulation conflicts with the language of a
statute."' 29 Since 1984, when it was decided, Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,130 the Supreme Court
has provided a framework for reviewing an agency's construction
of the statute it administers. In Chevron, the issue was whether
states could be allowed "to treat all of the pollution-emitting
devices within the same industrial grouping as though they were
encased within a single bubble," for the purposes of NSR
obligations for modifications.' 31 The Supreme Court reversed a
judgment by the D.C. Circuit because that court did not defer to the
EPA in its interpretation of the statute, where Congress had no
clear intent on the issue.' 32 It held that the lower court committed
a basic legal error in substituting its own construction of the term
"stationary source" for the administrative interpretation. 133 The
legacy of the decision is the extreme deference, termed "Chevron
deference," which is accorded to administrative agencies in cases
where congressional intent is not clear.
According to the test set out in Chevron, when reviewing
an agency's statutory construction, a court must make a twofold
inquiry. First, the court must look at whether Congress has
"directly spoken to the precise issue at question."' 134 If
congressional intent is clear, then the agency's regulations must
comply with the plain meaning of the statute.'1 35 Second, if
Congress has not directly addressed the precise issue in question,
administratively. "[T]here exists no general administrative power to create
exemptions to statutory requirements based upon the agency's perceptions of
costs and benefits." Id. at 357. The power to create exceptions "is not an ability
to depart from the statute, but rather a tool to be used in implementing the
legislative design." Id. at 360. However, the proposed changes are too
significant and inconsistent with Congressional intent to qualify as de minimis.
Id.
129 United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 888 (S.D. Ohio
2003).
130 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
131 Id. at 840 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6)).
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the court must inquire whether the agency's analysis is based on a
"permissible" construction of the statute. 136 Because
administration of a congressionally created program necessarily
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill
any implicit or explicit statutory gap, the court must accord
considerable deference to the agency.'
37
The EPA contends that the new rule is a permissible
construction of the Clean Air Act.' 38 However, under Chevron
"Step One," the EPA must first show that Congress left either an
explicit or implicit gap in the CAA's definition of "modification."
The EPA argues that the term "any physical or operational change"
is ambiguous because Congress did not specify the types of
activities that constitute "physical or operational change[s].', 139 If
the court agrees with the EPA on this point, under "Step Two" of
Chevron analysis, the court would have to defer to a "permissible"
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term. 140 The EPA alleges
that the new rule is a "permissible" construction of the statute
because it is consistent with the dual purpose of section 101 of the
CAA: "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air
resources so as to promote public health and welfare and
productive capacity of its population."'141 Given the two
competing interests, the agency claims that the new routine
maintenance rule represents "a reasonable accommodation of
manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference.' 42
136 Id. at 843.
137 Id. (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
138 Equipment Replacement Provision, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,247, 61,270 (Oct. 27,
2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52).
139 id.
140 id.
141 Id. at 61,271.
142 id.
A. Chevron Analysis
1. Chevron Step One
Step one of the Chevron analysis is to inquire whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise issue in question. 
143
The new RMRR exemption fails the first prong of the Chevron test
because it is contrary to congressional intent. The new rule is in
sharp contrast with the plain language of the statute, legislative
history, and the courts' interpretation of the statutory terms.
Congress defined "modification" in section I11 (a)(4) of the
CAA to encompass "any physical change.., which increases the
amount of any air pollutant emitted."' 44 The plain language of the
statute is clear. It is significant that the term "modification"
appears in the definition section of the CAA. 145 One would
presume that "any physical change" is not meant to be as
ambiguous as "modification," the term that it is supposed to
define. 146 Refusing to read any additional precision into the
definitional phrase that is inherent in the original term would
render the congressional effort at definition an exercise in
futility.
147
Furthermore, the new rule is inconsistent with judicial
interpretation of terms "modification" and "any." Under the new
RMRR rule a change that is less than twenty percent of a plant's
value is not a "modification." Excluding from the term
"modification" changes that cost millions of dollars and may
require suspension of operations is clearly contrary to judicial
interpretation of the term to mean "moderate change." In Alabama
Power Co., the court held that the term "modification" is not
limited to physical changes exceeding a certain magnitude.
48
After examining the legislative history of relevant provisions, the
143 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
144 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(a)(4) (2000).
145 Stephenson, supra note 127, at 10,801.
146 id.
147 id.
148 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
316 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 5
SPRING 20041 EPA's NEW REGULATORY POLICY 317
court concluded that "the language of the statute clearly did not
enact such limit into law." In WEPCO, the court stated that
Congress defined the term "modification" to encompass the most
trivial activities--"the replacement of leaky pipes, for example...
if the change results in an increase in the emissions of the
facility.' 149 In Ohio Edison, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio held that the term
"modification" is broadly defined and that the
words "any physical change" must be given their
plain meaning-that is, that any physical change to
the units at issue trigger CAA compliance
assuming, (1) the change also causes an increase in
emissions and (2) the change is not excluded by a
regulatory exemption. 1
50
The court also affirmed that the term "routine" must be given a
narrow interpretation.151 In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
AT&T, the Supreme Court held that the term "modify" as used in
the Federal Communications Act had a sufficiently plain meaning
that the Federal Communications Commissions Act interpretation
was invalid under Chevron step one. 152 The majority rejected the
argument that "modify" could mean "to change fundamentally.'
' 53
Instead, the court held that "modify" "connotes moderate
change.'
154
Similarly, by expanding the routine maintenance exception
to changes that do not exceed twenty percent of the plant's value,
the new rule impermissibly narrows the construction of the term
"any." The word "any" has not been treated as an insignificant
modifier but has been interpreted by the courts to be a clear
indication of Congressional intent. In United States v. Gonzalez,
the Supreme Court wrote that "[r]ead naturally, the word 'any' [in
a statute] has an expansive meaning, that is, 'one or some
149 Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1990).
150 United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 888 (S.D. Ohio
2003).
15 Id. at 888.
152 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
153 Id. at 227.
154 Id. at 227.
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indiscriminately of whatever kind. "5 5 In Missouri Municipal
League, the court wrote "time and time again, the Court has held
that the modifier 'any' prohibits a narrowing construction of a
statute."1
56
Legislative history reveals that the new rule is inconsistent
with Congress's ultimate goal of assuring "attainment of pollution
control standards by a fixed date.' 57 The Clean Air Act
Amendments were enacted to "speed up, expand, and intensify the
war against pollution in the United States with a view to assuring
that the air we breathe throughout the nation is wholesome once
again."'158 To lessen the burden on owners and operators of
utilities, Congress chose to require installation of pollution control
technology when sources underwent "modifications." Indeed,
members of the House recognized that "building control
technology into new plants at time of construction will be less
costly than requiring retrofit when pollution control ceilings are
reached.' 159 The logic underlying this approach is clear. As
Professor O'Hear points out, "while retrofit might be unduly
burdensome for a facility busily engaged in productive activities,
the same retrofit might be far less costly and intrusive if performed
in conjunction with other activities that significantly interrupted
production and involved restructuring of equipment."' 160 When
drafting the CAA, Congress was well aware that some power
plants would be unable to meet the NSR requirements and would
be forced to shut down.' 6 1 By permitting power plants to extend
155 United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997).
156 Mo. Mun. League v. Fed. Communication Comm'n, 299 F.3d 949, 954 (8th
Cir. 2002).
"'57 H.R. REP. No. 95-294, supra note 6.
158 H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.A.N. 5356.
159 H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 185 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.A.N. 1264.
160 Flatt et al., supra note 125, at 10,121. The EPA acknowledged this much in
the Legal Basis section of the new rules. "It is important to understand why
Congress chose [the time of modification as the point] at which to impose NSR
on existing plants: to avoid the need to impose costly retrofits, but require
placement of new control technology at a time when it makes the most sense for
it to be installed." Equipment Replacement Provision, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,247,
61,270 (Oct. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52).
161 S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 2-3 (1970).
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their lifetimes by replacing parts in whole and repeatedly use the
twenty percent exception, the new rule is contrary to congressional
intent to assure that all plants in this country are equipped with
pollution controls.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has been backing away
from the extremely deferential approach in Chevron.
Consequently, if it is not entirely clear whether the D.C. court
should invalidate the rules based on Chevron step one, MCI clearly
points to the conclusion that the EPA exceeded its authority in
promulgating the new regulations. 62 The court in MCI plainly
reversed an administrative agency's regulations, holding that in
authorizing permissive detariffing the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") had exceeded its authority under
Communications Act. 163 MCI stands for the proposition that an
agency exceeds its authority when its regulations are inconsistent
with direct statutory language on point and represent a drastic
departure from a longstanding regulatory scheme. MCI involved
the FCC's interpretation of the "modify" requirement in
Communications Act. 164 The FCC "modified" its regulatory
scheme to exclude nondominant carriers from rate-filing
requirements. 65 Whereas the statute required all carriers to file
tariffs, the Agency argued that the section in question permitted the
FCC to "modify" the regulations to allow permissive detariffing
policy.1 66 The court ruled that "since the agency's interpretation of
a statute is not entitled to deference when it goes beyond the
meaning that statute can bear, [the agency's change in policy] can
be justified only if it makes less than radical change in the
Act's ... requirement[s].' 67 Whether a change is minor or major
depends to some extent upon the importance of the item changed
to the whole.1 68 The court found that detariffing when the plain
language of the statute required tariffs was just such an
162 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
163 Id. at 234.
164 Id. at 225.
165 Id. at 223.
166 id.
167 Id. at 229.
168 Id.
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impermissible major change. 69 Like detariffing in MCI, the new
routine maintenance rule is contrary to the overall statutory scheme
and is a major departure from longstanding agency practice.
MCI and New York v. EPA are clearly analogous. The
plain language of the administrative statute in both cases speaks to
the issue in question.' 70 In both cases, an administrative agency
changed a longstanding interpretation of its enabling statute.
Finally, in both, the changes in interpretation have a major impact
on the regulatory regimes as a whole. The court should hold in
New York v. EPA that the EPA's new construction of the CAA
"goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear"' 71 and is
therefore invalid.
"An agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation that
conflicts with a prior interpretation is entitled to considerably less
deference than a consistently held agency view." 172 Without a
doubt the new rule represents a major break with the EPA's
traditional interpretation of the CAA. This is evident not only
from the fact that many of the modifications challenged by the
agency in its enforcement initiative would be permissible under the
new rule, but also by the fact that the new rule is inconsistent with
other parts of agency's regulations. For purposes of the NSPS
program, "an existing facility, upon reconstruction is treated as [a
new source] irrespective of any change in emission rate."
173
"Reconstruction" occurs when the cost of new components of the
plant exceed fifty percent of its fixed capital costs. 1 74 However, by
exempting those changes that (1) are replacements of units, (2) fall
below the twenty percent allowance, and (3) are routine
maintenance under the old rule, the EPA permits the plants to
undergo what essentially amounts to reconstruction without
triggering NSR. There is no reason why those activities that
169 Id. at 234.
170 Section 203 of the Communications Act plainly required communications
common carriers to file tariffs with the FCC. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000).
Similarly, the CAA plainly requires that a source apply for a permit if it
undergoes "any physical change." 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(4).
171 MCI, 512 U.S. at 229.
172 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994).
173 40 C.F.R. § 60.15(a) (2003).
114 Id. § 60.15(b).
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trigger NSR, if done in one year, should be exempt from NSR if
they are spaced out over a period of time.175
The new rule will also be inconsistent with the federalism
provisions of the CAA by depriving the states of a valuable
enforcement tool for complying with their SIP obligations. It is the
states, not the federal government or the EPA, that have the
primary responsibility for complying with NAAQS. 176 States are
penalized if they fail to comply. If in a state where emissions have
reached SIP ceiling increased efficiency improvements lead to the
allocation of more pollution to power plants, a state must offset
this allocation by reduction in pollution from other industries.
Consequently, the overall pollution levels may not increase but the
regulation will shift the burden of pollution control from power
plants to other industries. It is far from clear that such
reallocations would be socially efficient.
The regulation will be viewed as exempting the
grandfathered power plants because federal law preempts state
law. To the extent that this is true, the new rule undermines the
rights of the states under the CAA. Furthermore, the Agency's
claim that the overall levels of pollution will not increase rests on
the assumption that states will still be required to comply with
SIPs. However, the assertion that pollution will not increase
assumes that the overall emissions level within the state is at the
SIP-mandated pollution ceiling. If this is not the case, the
continued viability of SIPs does not guarantee that there will not be
an increase of pollution.
Given that Congress has directly spoken to the precise issue
in question, the agency is required to "give effect to the
,,177unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Further, the new
rule represents a drastic departure from a longstanding regulatory
scheme. It is inconsistent not only with the agency's prior
interpretations of the NSR provisions but also with other parts of
agency's regulations. Since the new routine maintenance
exception effectively swallows the rule, it should be struck down
by the D.C. district court.
'75 Flatt et al., supra note 125, 10,123.
176 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (2000).
177 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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2. Chevron Step Two
If the court does not invalidate the rule under "Step One" of
Chevron, the states will face a much more difficult task under
Chevron "Step Two." However, even under this deferential prong
of Chevron, the regulations may still fail. If Congress has
explicitly left a gap in the CAA, then the legislative regulations are
given controlling weight unless they are an impermissible
construction of the statute. Under Chevron "Step Two," the court
must look at whether the agency's construction of the term
"modification" may reasonably include a twenty percent routine
maintenance exemption. 178 The court must accord the agency's
interpretation great deference. It "need not conclude that the
agency's construction was the only one it permissibly could have
adopted.,
179
First, the courts have held that "the CAA should not be
interpreted in a way that would open vistas of indefinite immunity
from the provisions of New Source Performance Standards and
Prevention of Significant Deterioration."'1 80 The new rule amounts
to just that because nothing in the regulations would prohibit the
repeated use of the twenty percent exemption. Given that
Congress intended for the grandfathered power plants to be
eventually equipped with pollution controls, the broad RRMR
exemptions of the new rule are an unreasonable interpretation of
the statute.
Second, EPA's construction of the statute is unreasonable
because it jeopardizes the kind of health and environmental gains
that the CAA was meant to achieve. The enforcement initiative
had led to several sizeable settlements,181 accompanied by
178 "[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute." Id.
179 id.
180 Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 1990).
181 Richard A. Oppel & Christopher Drew, States Planning Own Lawsuits Over
Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at 1. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric and
three utilities that were not sued in the initial round (Wisconsin Electric
Company, Virginia Electric Power Company, and PSEG Fossil Ltd. Liability
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reduction in pollution. For example, Florida-based Teco Energy
agreed in 2000 to spend $1 billion to improve its pollution control
technology. 8 2 However, when the EPA first issued the rule
change, it also made a decision to hold off pursuing a number of
cases against power companies because the legal foundation of
those cases would no longer be valid.18 3 In November 2003, the
Agency made it known that it would close pending investigations
of seventy power plants and would consider dropping thirteen
other cases against utilities that had been referred to the Justice
Department for action. 184 As a result, a number of utilities walked
away from settlements. 85 For example, in 2000, Ohio-based
Cinergy, tentatively agreed to spend $1.4 billion to improve
emission controls in its coal-burning plants.1 86 However, after the
EPA declared its new approach to NSR, the talks stalled. In a
2000 report, the Energy Information Administration found that the
NSR enforcement effort, especially if broadened to address all
coal-fired power plants, would decrease NOx and SO2 emissions
by sixty to eighty percent. 187 A ruling that the EPA's change in
regulations is inconsistent with the statute is essential to the
continued viability of the enforcement effort.
1 88
Corporation) have also settled with the EPA. Gaynor & Lippard, supra note 74,
at 10,075.
182 Oppel, supra note 181.
183 Jennifer Lee, Most States Expect Pollution to Rise if Regulations Change,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at A16.
184 Eric Peanin, In Reversal, EPA to Push Cleanup of Power Plants, WASH.
POST, Jan. 22, 2004, at A23.
185 Oppel, supra note 181.
186 Id.
187 Energy Information Administration, Analysis of Strategies for Reducing
Multiple Emissions from Power Plants: Sulfur Dioxide, Nitrogen Oxides, and
Carbon Dioxide (2000), at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/powerplants/
pdf/sroiaf(2000)05.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
188 Following the suspension of the new rules pending litigation, the EPA sued
an eastern Kentucky power cooperative for expanding three of its coal-
generating units at its Spurlock and Dale Plants in violation of NSR. Erik
Peanin, Bush Moves to Defuse Environmental Criticism, WASH. POST, Feb. 2,
2004, at A05; Eric Peanin, Justice Dept Sues Ky. Utility for Breach of Clean Air
Act, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2004, at A02.
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Third, the EPA argues that the new rule will do little more
than allow industry to make modifications that would improve
efficiency and consequently, decrease pollution.' 89 This argument
is misleading if not disingenuous. Under the old rules, efficiency
improvements that are environmentally beneficial and reduce
emissions do not trigger NSR because a physical change that
decreases or even slightly increases emissions does not constitute a
"6modification.' 190 Just such a situation occurred when Detroit
Edison Co. applied for review of planned modifications of its
Monroe Power Plant. The EPA determined that the projects were
significant enough to qualify as "modification." However, because
the changes would not lead to emissions' increase, they were
exempt from NSR program. 191
Fourth, the new rule is inconsistent with the technology-
pushing objectives of the Clean Air Act. Congress intended for the
CAA to provide an incentive for improvement and adoption of
pollution control technology.' 92 Clean coal technologies have the
potential to remove almost all of the harmful emissions.'1 93 In
189 Equipment Replacement Provision, 68 Fed. Reg. 61247, 61270 (Oct. 27,
2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52).
190 A "modification" is defined as "any physical change in, or change in the
method of operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any
air pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any air
pollutant not previously emitted." 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(4) (2000) (emphasis
added). Furthermore, the agency recognizes a de minimis exception.
191 Detroit Edison Monroe Power Plant Applicability Determination, May 23
Applicability Determination (May 23, 2000), at http://yosemite.epa.gov/r5/
ardcorre.nsf/0/a9cee4cceeeb 1 a00862568ef0067a795?OpenDocument (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
"'92 S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 17 (1970).
193 Clean coal technologies can be separated into three distinct categories: pre-
combustion processing of coal, combustion processes that bum coal more
cleanly, and post-combustion processes that scrub the exhausts. Clean Coal's
Uphill Haul, ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 2002, at 5. The most widely used method of
cleaning coal is the post combustion processes that scrub the exhausts.
Typically, the flue gas is contacted with an aqueous slurry of limestone in a
countercurrent absorber, or scrubber. Sulphur dioxide reacts with the limestone
to form gypsum. This byproduct may be sold directly or used in cement
production. 2001 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, TOPICAL REPORT NUMBER 18:
CLEAN COAL TECHNOLOGY 5, http://www.lanl.gov/projects/cctc/topicalreports/
documents/topical 1 8.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
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general, clean coal technologies decrease pollution through
improved operating efficiencies and lowered costs of air emission
controls. For example, integrated gasification cycle1 94 removes
ninety-nine percent of sulphur and reduces the other emissions
below standard, while improving operational efficiency from
thirty-three to forty percent. There are already two plants in
America that have adopted this technology.' 95 The costs, however,
remain high.
One of the main benefits of a regulation such as NSR is that
it forces power plants to adopt clean coal technologies. Thus, as
the market for these technologies expands, the firms that develop
and manufacture devises such as scrubbers will become more
efficient and the cost of adopting these technologies will fall.
Furthermore, an expanded market allows for entry of additional
clean coal technology manufacturers that would also reduce cost
through competition. However, the effect of the new regulations is
to decrease the market for these technologies, keeping costs high
and removing incentives for innovation and adoption of
technologies that can remove the vast majority of pollutants that
threaten public health and the environment. Such a result is
manifestly contrary to objectives of CAA and the Congressional
intent.
The new rule is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute
because it distorts the market incentives. Under the new regulatory
Technology). This technology cleanses exhausts of sulphur dioxide and
nitrogen oxides. Id. A good modem system can remove up to ninety-five
percent of sulphur from exhausts for a third of the costs of earlier technologies.
Id.
194 The process turns coal into a gas which is then cleansed and burned in a
combustion turbine to produce electricity. Residual heat in the exhaust gas from
the gas turbine is recovered in a heat recovery boiler as steam, which can be
used to produce additional electricity in a steam turbine generator. This
technology allows companies to capture carbon dioxide from the exhaust more
easily, while producing electricity more efficiently than is possible with other
clean-coal methods. Most importantly, IGCC can be retrofitted on to existing
plants. Id.
195 Rose, supra note 3 (describing Tampa Electric's plant in Florida and Psi
Energy's 260 megawatt Wabash River Generating Station at Terre Haute in
Indiana, a 1950s power plant which was retrofitted with a gasification process at
a cost of $430M).
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scheme, grandfathered power plants will never internalize
environmental and health costs associated with air pollution.
Consequently, the output of these plants will perpetually exceed
the socially efficient level. Unlike the newer power plants,
grandfathered plants pay only the private costs of producing
energy. One result is that plants that should be shut down will
continue to operate. Further, the presence of these old plants
makes it more difficult for new firms to enter the market. Since
complying with the CAA increases costs of production, new firms
are at a disadvantage when competing with grandfathered plants.
With many old plants in the market, the sum of private and public
costs of energy production is likely to exceed the value to society
of the power produced. Such a warped system of incentives
undermines the main objective of the CAA, which is to ensure that
new clean power plants will replace the old polluters by a fixed
date.
Fifth, the new rule will complicate the section 126
provisions which down-wind states use to challenge the emissions
in plants in up-wind states.1 96 Section 126 is an important
provision that has been successfully used by the states to fight up-
wind polluters. It allows any state that is unable to meet its
emissions cap to petition the Administrator for a finding that a
plant in an up-wind state exceeds its emissions of criteria
pollutants. 19 This provision is usually used to challenge plants for
NSR violations. Consequently, a change in NSR rules will also
undermine one of the only tools available to states in controlling
interstate pollution.
Even though Chevron stands for the proposition that the
courts should refrain from meddling in administrative policy, the
court should consider invalidating the new routine maintenance
rule. Given that the new rule is in conflict with the central
objective of the CAA, to ensure installation of pollution controls
by a fixed date, the Agency's actions are contrary to Congressional
intent. As is, Chevron represents a significant power shift from
Congress to administrative agencies. To rule that only "big
196 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (2000).
' 97 Id. § 7426(b).
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physical change" is a reasonable interpretation of "any physical
change" would be to take out of Chevron whatever weak bite it
might have had.
IV. Conclusion
Whether under Chevron, MCI, or the de minimis theory,
the EPA's legal justification for the regulation rests on shaky
ground. The EPA's new regulatory policy should be invalidated
because it is inconsistent with Congressional intent and with
objectives of the Clean Air Act.
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